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"SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES": TEENS, WELFARE AND
POLITICS IN ONTARIO DURING THE 1990s
R. BLAKE BROWN*
RISUMI
Dans cet article, l'auteur trace 1'6volution des politiques en Ontario concernant les
demandeurs d'aide sociale de seize et dix-sept ans au cours des ann6es quatre-vingt-
dix. Il y pr6sente l'6volution historique des dispositions en mati~re d'aide sociale pour
les jeunes ontariens au cours des deux derni6res d6cennies. I1 y identifie les questions
de politiques importantes. II y souligne les contestations d'ordre constitutionnel qui
ont eu lieu. L'auteur conclut en faisant des observations et des recommandations
concernant d'6ventuels changements au r6seau qui pourraient rendre plus efficaces
les politiques d'aide sociale pour les jeunes. I1 brosse un tableau du d6bat entourant
cette question d'un point de vue id6ologique et avance l'argument que les actuelles
politiques envers les jeunes ont 6t6 le fruit d'un d6bat polaris6 et politique entre des
perceptions concurrentes de la jeunesse. Les opposants l'aide sociale envers les
jeunes disent que cela est cofiteux, que cela encourage l'clatement de la famille et
cr6e une g6n6ration de fraudeurs de l'aide sociale. D'un autre c6t6, les d6fenseurs
affirment que nous avons la responsabilit6 d'aider les jeunes dans le besoin. Cette
question est devenue fortement politis6e au cours des ann6es quatre-vingt-dix et on
n'a pas fait de cas du fait que les politiques d'avant 1995 6taient g6n6ralement
adquates mais pi~trement mises en oeuvre. Parmi les questions d'actualit6 et A venir
qui devront 8tre prises en consid6ration, on compte la r6solution des questions d'ordre
constitutionnel de m~me que le recentrage du d6bat sur les jeunes plut~t que de se
servir de cette question conme une arme politique.
R. Blake Brown wrote this paper while in his second year of a Bachelor of Laws degree at the Fac-
ulty of Law of the University of Toronto. He is currently in a Master of Arts degree with a major in
History at York University and plans to return to the Faculty of Law of the University of Toronto in
1999.
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1) INTRODUCTION
Since the Progressive Conservative Party's victory in the 1995 Ontario provincial
election, Premier Mike Harris and his cabinet have radically restructured Ontario's
social programs. Many Ontario residents have voiced their complaints about a gov-
ernment that seems intent on bringing middle-American values to what has historically
been a province of relatively high quality social assistance programs. 1 However, one
group that has not been heard from in the outcry is marginalized youth. This segment
of the population represents those sixteen and seventeen year olds facing increased
difficulties receiving welfare assistance despite their often trying backgrounds. Since
taking office the Progressive Conservatives have made good their promise to limit the
benefits paid to youth, and have faced virtually no public demand that this be stopped
or altered.
This paper will frame the debate surrounding this issue in ideological terms, lay out
the development of Ontario's youth welfare provisions during the last two decades,
identify the key policy issues, highlight the constitutional challenges involved, and
conclude by making observations and recommendations regarding possible future
changes to the system that could create a more effective youth welfare policy. It will
be argued that the current legal policy towards youth has been the result of a polarized,
political debate between competing perceptions of youth. Opponents of youth welfare.
argue that it is costly, encourages family breakdown, and creates a generation of
welfare abusers. Proponents, on the other hand, claim that there is always a responsi-
bility to assist youth in need.
The issue has become highly politicized during the 1990s, and the fact that the
pre-1995 policy was generally adequate, but poorly implemented, has been disre-
garded. The current and future issues to be faced include the resolution of constitu-
tional issues, and refocusing the debate on the needs of young people.
2) FRAMING THE POLICY DEBATE
The debate over youth welfare in Ontario has mirrored the discussion throughout
Canada, and in many Western nations, over the role of social assistance in modem
society. According to Andrew Armitage, the traditional liberal discourse concerning
social assistance was characterized by seven key values; a concern for the individual;
faith in humanity; equitable treatment of individuals; equal treatment of individuals;
a concern for community; an acceptance of diversity; and a belief in democracy.2
These factors culminated in a belief that social assistance was a right of all citizens.
In comparison, the conservative viewpoint in relation to welfare has been enunciated
by the C,.D. Howe Institute:
1. R. Ellsworth, "Squandering our Inheritance: Re-forming the Canadian Welfare State in the 1990s"
(1997) 12 J.L. & Social Pol'y 259.
2. A. Armitage, Social Welfare in Canada Revisited, 3d ed. (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University
Press, 1996) at 12.
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Canada's social programs need repair. They are too elaborate. They are too expen-
sive. And they may not be good for the people they are supposed to help. They may
not have caused Canada's huge debt problem, but they are too large a component of
public expenditures not to be part of the solution.3
The conservative view is often at odds with the traditional liberal conception. For
instance, welfare conservatives have little faith in humanity. Welfare should be granted
under supervision due to a suspicion that fraud is the foundation for most welfare
claims. A "public largesse model," in which welfare constitutes a public charity, is the
principle underlying the conservative view. Rather than perceive poverty as indicative
of the Canadian economy's structural failures, conservatives believe poverty is a result
of individual citizens' inadequacies.
The question of youth welfare in Ontario is part of this larger debate. Until the
enactment of the Ontario Works Act, 19974 youth applied for welfare under the General
Welfare Assistance Act (GWAA). 5 Applications for support were made to municipal
welfare offices.6 These offices provided social assistance to individuals in accordance
with the guidelines established by the provincial Ministry of Community and Social
Services. Under this two-tiered system, funding for social assistance was provided
from both the provincial and municipal levels of government. Welfare administrators
examined applicant's circumstances, then decided the youth's eligibility under special
rules that apply to youth. There are several rationales for, and against, this type of
support.
The foremost concern for proponents is that youths are unable to leave abusive homes
without financial assistance. A "typical" case would be a sixteen-year old who has
long suffered as a "victim" of an abusive parent. In the absence of access to social
assistance, such a youth would have three primary choices. The abused youth could
go to the police to seek an end to the abuse, stay in his or her current position until it
became more feasible to leave, or run away from home and gain employment thereby
prematurely ending his or her education. 7 Each of these options are obviously prob-
lematic for teenagers. For example, given the clear connections between education
and earning potential, leaving home to gain employment is a poor alternative. The
issue of youth crime must also be considered. The Canadian public has demonstrated
a considerable concern with teenage crime,8 and advocates of teenage welfare believe
3. W. Watson, The Case for Change: Reinventing the Welfare State (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute,
1995) at 1.
4. Ontario Works Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c.25, Sch.A [hereinafter Ontario Works Act]
5. General Welfare Assistance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.G.6, as amended. A closer examination of the alter-
ations in social assistance legislation as pertaining to youth will be discussed later in this paper.
6. Under the Ontario Works Act, municipal welfare offices have been renamed Ontario Works offices.
7. Similar concerns about physical abuse on teenagers have been raised in the British context. See G.
Randall, No Way Home: Homeless Young People in Central London (London: Centrepoint, 1988).
8. J.B. Sprott, "Understanding Public Views of Youth Crime and the Youth Justice System" (1996) 38
Can. J. Crim. 271.
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that viable alternatives are required to prevent teenagers from turning to criminal
activities. This is especially true given that the teenage years are an important period
in developing youth as good citizens. The European Foundation for the Improvement
of Living and Working Conditions has stated that:
Young adulthood is a crucial and formative period in the life cycle, full of
challenge, risk and potential. However, tensions are arising out of the extension of
this period of transition to autonomy. Moreover, increasing numbers of young peo-
ple are coming to suffer multiple difficulties in making the transition to adulthood
and are becoming excluded from mainstream society through poverty, unemploy-
ment, lack of qualifications, homelessness. In the worst cases this exclusion leads to
the use of drugs and alcohol, to criminality and delinquency.9
Opponents, however, are concerned with the potential negative effects of youth
welfare. Many argue that the family unit remains the primary method of structuring
Canadian society, and there are fears that giving teenagers the financial resources to
leave home might encourage youths to remove themselves from situations that are far
from dire. This view characterizes teenagers as welfare abusers, as freeloaders
responsible for their own sorry positions. Teenagers probably seek monthly welfare
cheques in order to move away from home and pursue practices frowned upon by their
parents, such as consuming alcohol, partying excessively, staying out all night, and
using illegal drugs. Proponents of this view suggest that difficult home circumstances
are often the result of the teenager's actions, not those of the parents. For example, a
sixteen-year old wanting assistance might attempt to infuriate his or her parents so
that he or she would be told to leave. The danger, it is suggested, is that youth social
assistance could create a generation of welfare abusers - a generation of dishonest
sixteen and seventeen year olds who believe government assistance is the easy answer.
Legislators have been required to balance these two views: they must provide support
for youth in damaging family situations, but they must also be wary of undermining
family structures that often experience tension as children enter their teenage years.
Therefore, until recently, the law has sought the middle ground, refusing to grant
sixteen and seventeen year olds a fully independent status until they can demonstrate
"special circumstances" in their lives requiring them to move away from home. The
nuances of this test will be discussed later in this paper, but for now it is necessary to
note that this "special circumstances" restriction has not been placed on other welfare
applicants.
This compromise has dissatisfied many. At one extreme have been those who perceive
youth welfare applicants as truly needy welfare applicants. Advocates claim that many
youth come from abusive homes, and therefore the higher standard is too onerous. It
places a'restrictive burden on applicants whose need is as great, if not greater, than
the majority of welfare recipients. Opponents, on the other hand, have been interested
in toughening the test to reduce youth benefits. As will be shown, the public debate
9. European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Growing Up, Leav-
ing Home (Luxembourg: E.C. Commission, 1990) at 4.
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on this issue, carried out in the press and amongst politicians, typically fell into a
debate between these two polarized views. Not surprisingly, however, many teenage
welfare applicants did not actually fall into one of these two extremes. Some youths
were looking for easy money with which to break free of parental control, while others
were among the most needy of all people - abused children. A substantial segment
probably fell on the continuum between these extremes. The following will illustrate
the debate between the two views and will also demonstrate that there is no such thing
as a typical teenage applicant.
3) YOUTH WELFARE IMPLEMENTATION AND DEBATE, PRE-1996
With an understanding of the basic policy rationales underlying the debate, this paper
will now turn to examining the issue's development during the 1990s.
a) Policy Formation: 1970-1995
Prior to 1971 there was no special test used for teenage welfare applicants in Ontario.
The regulations of the General Welfare Assistance Act defined anyone over sixteen
years of age as an adult, and determined that teenagers above this age still completing
their secondary school education were eligible for assistance. 10 In 1971, these regu-
lations were amended to provide that a single person under eighteen was not eligible
for assistance "where the welfare administrator is of the opinion after making appro-
priate inquiry that it is not contrary to his best interests to reside in the home of his
parent.""I There was, however, no need to prove special circumstances until 1976,
when the issue of youth welfare became a topic for debate in the Ontario legislature.
It was reported in the press in 1976 that 500 teenagers in Toronto were receiving
welfare. 12 Though the opposition New Democratic Party suggested that the govern-
ment should blame itself for welfare abuse, the Progressive Conservative government
of the day implemented new requirements that became the basis of the "special
circumstances" test. The 1976 regulations stated that an "employable person under the
age of eighteen who is not the head of a family is not eligible for assistance unless the
welfare administrator is satisfied that there are special circumstances that justify
providing the assistance." 13 The Minister of Community and Social Services, J.A.
Taylor, explained why this stipulation was necessary. He suggested that it:
... Is incumbent now upon a welfare officer to make payments to a child between
the ages of, say, 16 and 18 who has left home and who may not be going to school.
That mandatory provision is being redressed so that payment of welfare to that type
of person will be on a discretionary basis rather than on a mandatory basis. I think
that is good in that it will not encourage children of that age to leave home and to
10. Regulation made under the General Welfare Assistance Act, O.Reg. 150/70.
11. Regulation made under the General Welfare Assistance Act O.Reg. 248/71.
12. Toronto Star (18 February 1976) B1.
13. Regulation to Amend Regulation 383 of Revised Regulation of Ontario, 1970 made under the Gen-
eral Welfare Assistance Act, O.Reg. 293/76.
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set up independent house keeping for no good reason.
Mind you, there may be circumstances in which a young person may be better off
out of the family setting because of severe home problems. It may be better for his
health, physical and mental. Those cases, of course, will be dealt with individually
in light of their own particular circumstances.
14
These concerns were echoed again and again in the next twenty years.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, several government reports studied the issue
of teen welfare. In the influential 1988 Transitions report, the Social Assistance
Review Committee published a comprehensive plan for improving the Ontario welfare
system.15 Using the principle that "lack of need ought to be the only criterion for the
denial of assistance, unless there are clear and justifiable reasons why other criterion
ought to prevail," the Review Committee recommended that some limitations be
placed on teen welfare applicants. It recommended that sixteen and seventeen year olds
be eligible for social assistance, but subject to a special approach to "opportunity
planning."'16 This special opportunity planning was intended to help rectify family
problems, or assist in making the youth self-sufficient. 17 It was felt that "planning and
counselling must be provided to young applicants as soon as possible."' Is
When the New Democratic Party was elected in 1990 there were suggestions that the
special circumstances test would be eliminated in favour of a needs-based test. In
1991, the Ontario government's Advisory Group on New Social Assistance Legisla-
tion recommended that the onus of demonstrating special circumstances be reversed
- applicants should be considered eligible unless there were special circumstances
that indicated that they should not be eligible. 19 However, the Advisory Group
retreated from this position in 1992, asking that a "special assessment" be made of
teenage applicants.2 0 No major policy change, however, was implemented at that time.
A new policy was prepared in 1994 and circulated for comment, but was not
implemented. Finally, in 1995, despite appeals by a variety of concerned groups
requesting that youth not be required to face more stringent requirements, a new,
tougher policy was released.21
14. Ontario Legislative Assembly, Debates (17 March 1976) at 572 (J.A. Taylor).
15. Ontario, Report of the Social Assistance Review Committee: Transitions (Toronto, Queen's Printer,
13 May 1988)(Chair: G. Thomson).
16. Ibid. at 141.
17. Ibid. at 235-236.
18. Ibid.; at 236.
19. Ontario, Back on Track: First Report of the Advisory Group on New Social Assistance Legislation:
Report on Short-term Reform (Toronto: Queen's Printer, March 1991) (Chair A. Moscovitch) at 13.
20. Ontario, Time for Action: Principal Report of Advisory Group on New Social Assistance Legislation:
Report on Legislative Reform (Toronto: Queen's Printer, May 1992) (Chair A. Moscovitch) at 45.
21. I. Morrison, "GWA Eligibility & Entitlement Issues 'Special Circumstances': Teens," Clinic
Resource Office Current Issues Paper, (Clinic Resource Office, 26 May 1995) at 1.
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b) Pre-1995 Policy Implementation
As mentioned, a key component of the regulations was the requirement that sixteen
and seventeen-year olds prove "special circumstances" to receive welfare benefits.
Only sole-support parents and married couples under eighteen years of age were not
subject to the special circumstances requirements. However, what constituted special
circumstances was not strictly defined prior to April 1995, and the decision of whether
to grant assistance was quite discretionary. 22 The Ministry Policy Manual suggested
that a successful applicant had to show that "there is no 'suitable home' and / or it is
not in the best interests of the youth to return to this home. ' 23 The administrator was
to take into consideration health concerns, and "concerns about physical safety or
serious emotional conflict. '24 Without a more precise regulatory framework, the
decisions of the Social Assistance Review Board (SARB) filled the gap by providing
guidance as to how the policy should be interpreted. SARB was the highest adminis-
trative appeal mechanism under the GWAA. It heard appeals from the decisions of
welfare administrators all across Ontario, and though the decisions of the appeal
tribunal are not binding like Canadian judicial precedents, they did provide an
indication of how policies were to be implemented. 25
SARB usually granted assistance in cases involving child abuse. For example, in one
case special circumstances were proven where a sixteen year old left home after being
kicked out by her father - a father that had a history of physically abusing his
children.26 In another case, emotional abuse by an alcoholic parent constituted special
circumstances, 27 and in another special circumstances were found to exist where the
youth was concerned about a mother's abusive boyfriend. 28 However, SARB was
reluctant to allow appeals for support where the alleged abuse was not onerous, or was
unproven. Two examples illustrate this. In one case, SARB refused assistance where
part of the youth's claim was based on a single physical confrontation. 29 In another
case, SARB did not grant assistance where the allegations of abuse were unproven,
and where the tribunal felt the parents had reasonable grounds for imposing restrictive
rules on their daughter's conduct.30
22. Ibid.
23. Ontario, Ministry of Community and Social Services General Welfare Policy Manual (1 February
1994) Tab 0304-05 at 2-3. [hereinafter, Policy Manual].
24. Ibid. at3.
25. For a discussion of recent changes to the Social Assistance Review Board see T.J. Weiler, "Indepen-
dence, Impartiality, & the Ontario Social Assistance Review Board in 1997" (1997) 12 J.L. & Social
Pol'y 178.
26. SARB G-08-22-17 (30 January 1989; Bolduc, Roy).
27. SARB J-02-29-23/J-05-15-13 (10 December 1990; Novac, O'Connell).
28. SARB K-01-15-29 (9 September 1991; Douglas, Rangan).
29. SARB N-04-05-35 (21 November 1994; Roy).
30. SARB H-08-09-12 (20 August 1990; Nikius, Quamina, Roy).
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Appeals were also successful when parents were unwilling to support their children,
even in those situations in which the teenager had a role in creating the poor home
environment. Such was the case where a seventeen year old had uncontrollable
behavioural problems that resulted in him being asked to leave home.31 In another
scenario, two sisters fought verbally and physically. The sixteen year old daughter left
home when her mother threatened that she would move unless the sisters stopped
fighting. Again, SARB deemed the situation to be one of special circumstances.
32
SARB was wary of finding special circumstances in situations that could be described
as instances of normal teenage-parent conflict. These included situations in which
teenagers were unwilling to move back into their parents' homes because it was too
distant from a particular community,33 or where the conflict was the result of chores,
rules, and the parents' decisions regarding how they disposed of their income.
34
SARB jurisprudence on youth welfare was summarized in a 1994 decision. Special
circumstances had been found in cases when 1) there was emotional, physical or sexual
abuse by a parent; 2) when youth were asked to leave home and not return; 3) there
existed unreasonable or inconsistent house rules; 4) the mental or physical health of
parents was deteriorating; 5) situations equivalent to abuse; 6) when a parent was an
alcoholic; or, 7) when family problems resulted in poor school performance. On the
other hand, special circumstances were not deemed to exist where 1) the family
conflict was the result of rebellion against reasonable house rules; 2) the reason for
leaving was not because of family breakdown; 3) there was no evidence of abuse; 4)
the claim consisted only of family arguments; 5) the complaints were unsubstantiated,
or; 6) the circumstances for leaving were beyond the parents' control.
35
The number of teenagers receiving welfare in Ontario increased dramatically in
percentage terms under the NDP government, although they remained a numerically
small group. In 1990, 7316 sixteen and seventeen year olds were receiving welfare
assistance. In March of 1994, this figure climbed to 10,965,36 an increase of 49.9 per
31. SARB K-i 1-20-12 (14 December 1992; O'Connell, Brooks).
32. SARB M-05-24-23 (25 January 1994; Cardinal).
33. SARB N-04-05-35 (21 November 1994; Roy).
34. SARB M-08-25-07 (5 October 1994; Adams).
35. Ibid. SARB's efforts to give meaning to the special circumstances test is illustrative of the search for
an adequate test to determine teens' eligibility for social assistance in other jurisdictions. For exam-
ple, in Britain teenagers are required to prove "exceptional hardship" in their living conditions to be
accepted. They do not, however, have to prove that they had good reasons for leaving home. See N.
Harris, "Youth, Citizenship and Welfare" (May 1992) J. Soc. Welfare and Fam. L. 175. Similarly,
the Australian Social Security Act requires that there be "exceptional circumstances" that necessitate
the child leaving home. For an example of the application of this test see the following decision of
the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal: Re Secretary, Department of Social Security and
Tu-Nguyen Tran (1991), 23 A.L.D. 449. In Tran, a seventeen-year old youth was threatened by his
father if he returned home after quitting school and leaving home. The Administrative Appeals Tri-
bunal held that this scenario entitled the youth to receive benefits as a homeless person.
36. M. Philp, " een-agers a Prime Target for Harris Assistance Cuts" Globe and Mail (14 July 1995) A6.
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cent. Nevertheless, the 1990 figure represented 5.2 per cent of the total welfare
recipients in Ontario, while in 1994 it represented only 2.9 per cent. The reasons for
this numerical increase are difficult to establish, but there are several potential factors.
First, the economic recession of the early 1990s may have placed additional economic
strain on families and youth, which led to more teenagers leaving home. A second
factor may have been the increased awareness of youth of their eligibility for welfare,
a trend that several non-profit groups encouraged. 37 This factor was likely accentuated
by the large amount of media attention the issue received in 1994. Lastly, interim
assistance - that is, assistance granted to appellants by the SARB pending the
determination of their appeals - was granted liberally to teenagers who appealed the
rejection of their applications. 38 With SARB's increasing caseload during the reces-
sion of the early 1990s, SARB became backlogged, and a growing number of teens
were placed on interim assistance. 39
c) Politicizing the Issue: Calls to Reduce Youth Welfare, 1994-1995
Regardless of the reasons, the numerical growth in teenage welfare recipients soon
became a political liability for the NDP, as did the growing number of welfare
recipients generally.40 Attempts to limit youth welfare, however, did not begin in
Ontario. The issue was an important one in Alberta where Premier Ralph Klein cut the
benefits to teen recipients even more than other groups. 41 Between 1993 and 1996,
the number of teenage welfare recipients in Alberta dropped 75 per cent. Proponents
of the policy believed that the cuts were necessary to put teens back to work.
42
Ontario's Conservatives noted the popularity of this policy, and stated that they would
adopt similar measures. 43
In 1994 the Progressive Conservatives made clear their intention to limit the availabil-
ity of welfare to teenagers. The issue fit perfectly with the aims of the Conservative's
cost-cutting agenda. Given that there were only a few thousand youth affected, none
of whom could vote and who were predominantly apolitical, teenagers offered a
powerless, voiceless target in comparison to some other recipients of welfare, such as
the physically disabled, who were more organized and thus better able to resist
37. For example, see Justice for Children and Youth, Know Your Rights: A Legal Guide to Your Rights
and Responsibilities for Young People Under 18 (Toronto: Justice for Children and Youth, 1997).
38. Interview with C. Milne (18 March 1998). Ms. Milne is a Staff Lawyer with Justice for Children and
Youth in Toronto.
39. Between 1990 and 1995, SARB experienced a 170 percent increase in its caseload. Weiler supra
note 25 at 187.
40. The NDP government's reluctance to have welfare expand further can be seen in many government
publications. For example, see Ontario, Assistance in Ontario: Finding the Problems and Fixing
Them (October 1994).
41. The relevant Alberta statute is the Social Assistance Development Act, R.S.A. 1970, c.S-16. The reg-
ulations determining eligibility are the SocialAllowances Regulation Alta. Reg. 213/93.
42. M. Jenkinson, "Better to Wash Cars than Starve: Cutting the Dole Puts Youth to Work" Alberta
Report (28 April 1997).
43. Supra note 36.
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government attacks. In tightening the requirements for youth welfare, the Conserva-
tives tapped attitudes that prevail across much of North America - the fear of youth
crime, youth delinquency and the perception that a generation has gone astray. As the
federal government's planned replacement of the Young Offenders Act demonstrates,
all levels of government in Canada seem convinced that the correct recipe of legal
inputs has not yet been found to adequately adjust teenage behaviour to conform with
some undefined ideal of youth culture. 44 Combining societal fears of young offender
crime with the desire to reduce welfare payments created high-powered ammunition
for the Conservatives with which to attack the NDP prior to the 1995 Ontario
provincial election.
The Conservatives' position was clearly articulated in the Ontario legislature.
Throughout 1994 opposition members hammered away at the high price of welfare,
and the costs of youth assistance. Politicians continually demonstrated their polarized
position on youth welfare recipients. An example is a 29 March 1994 debate between
Mike Harris and the then Minister of Community and Social Services, Tony Silipo.
Harris pointed towards the increased cost of Ontario's welfare system and dis-
cussed youth as an example. According to Harris, "16- and 17-year-olds have been
simply saying 'I don't want to live at home anymore,' and they are eligible for
welfare."' 45 Silipo tried to correct Harris' comment regarding eligibility, pointing
out that:
... We have to be able to continue to provide support in those instances where there
is abuse or other legitimate reasons for the young person leaving home but to also
make it clear that we will not support young people simply leaving home, and
becoming automatically eligible for social assistance.46
The Conservatives nevertheless continued to attack youth welfare. Particular exam-
ples of irregular implementation of the welfare program were used to undermine the
government's position. On March 30, 1994, Ted Arnott, a Progressive Conservative
44. See the federal government's policy statement on the upcoming replacement to the Young Offenders
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.Y-I: Canada, A Strategy for the Renewal of Youth Justice (Ottawa: Department
of Justice, 1998). The societal preoccupation with youth crime and delinquency - and the failure of
the law to correct this perceived problem - forms an important part of the contextual background
for the issue of youth welfare during all of the 1990s. The academic literature on the societal preoc-
cupation with youth delinquency and crime is extensive. See, for example, supra note 8. For exam-
ples of recent media comments on the problems of youth crime in Ontario see T. Boyle, "Shame
Seen as Crime Fighter" Toronto Star (2 June 1998) A3; T. Blackwell, "Ontario Urged to Crack
Down on Minor Crime" Globe and Mail, (10 December 1997) A10; R. DiManno, "Brutal Teen
Clash is Just Routine Stuff as City gets Meaner" Toronto Star (10 June 1996) A7; K. Makin,
"Oniario Targets Young Offenders" Globe and Mail (3 June 1996) Al; H. Hess, "Juveniles Climb-
ing Robbery Charts" Globe and Mail (16 May 1996) Al; I. Vincent, "Girl-gang Violence Alarms
Experts" Globe and Mail (12 September 1995) A10. More balanced accounts have been considerably
less prevalent, but for an example see K. Orstad, "What are we afraid of?.: The Myth of Youth
Crime" Saturday Night (March 1997) 46.
45. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates (29 March 1994) at 5231 (M.D. Harris).
46. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates (29 March 1994) at 5231 (T. Silipo).
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MPP from Wellington, stated that the Minister of Community and Social Services was
unaware of the true situation. "The minister is not well-informed on what's going on
today," Arnott suggested, "because today in Wellington county there is a 16-year-old
girl receiving welfare who lives in a self-contained apartment attached to her parents'
house. She collects welfare and pays rent to her parents. ' 47 Silipo could only respond
that the girl had probably been granted interim assistance. This response was leapt
upon by Harris, who pointed out that interim assistance had too commonly been
awarded, often for long periods. Interim assistance was given to other categories of
applicants as well, yet Harris' use of teenagers to illustrate his point again suggested
that they were a safe target. "Do you know," Harris queried "of even one example -
one, all across the province - where a 16- or 17-year-old who claimed that he or she
needed welfare was refused?" 48 Silipo's response was twice interrupted by interjec-
tions, but he took a balanced approach. He admitted that there were instances of abuse,
but that the government's approach "is not to assume, as members of the third party
seem to want to assume, that every 16- and 17-year-old who is receiving social
assistance is not entitled to receive social assistance. '49 This was, however, the
conclusion that the Conservatives seemed determined to prove. Harris pointed out in
April 1994 that the number of teenage welfare cases had doubled in three years, and
suggested that the reason for this was not hard economic times or an increased
awareness of youth to their rights, but was because "16- and 17-year-olds have learned
how to beat the system."' 50 Moreover, it was submitted that youth crime was actually
assisted by teen welfare. Though one rationale of the welfare program was to prevent
teenagers from turning to crime, MPP James Bradley suggested during a discussion
of the Young Offenders Act that allowing youths to establish themselves independent
of their parents "contributes, to a certain extent" to the problem of youth crime. How
did Bradley propose this might occur? He gave one example in which he alleged that
a teenager tried to provoke his father to violence because, "then, of course, that would
make for easy student welfare."'51 These issues continued to be raised in the legislature
throughout 1994.52
d) The Role of the News Media
The news media took note of this issue and adopted the Conservatives' position.
Complaints were published about the cost of granting welfare to youth and of the
negative social effects of youth welfare. A 1994 article by sociologist Elaine Lowe
published in the Globe and Mail reiterated the Conservative Party's perception that
47. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates (30 March 1994) at 5272 (T. Amott).
48. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates (30 March 1994) at 5272 (M. D. Harris).
49. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates (30 March 1994) at 5272 (T. Silipo).
50. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates (12 April 1994) at 5533 (M.D. Harris).
51. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates (7 June 1994) at 6714 (J. Bradley).
52. See Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates (29 March 1994) at 5286-5287; (7 April 1994) at 5438-
5441; (18 April 1994) at 5670-5671; (7 June 1994) at 6692-6693; (16 November 1994) at 7719,
7723 & 7735-7736; (7 December 1994) at 8408.
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lethargic youth applicants were looking for handouts. Lowe discussed her son's
decision to move out. She alleged that he did not move out because of abuse, but
because he believed welfare could be taken at his choosing. This decision was a painful
one for the author to accept:
For me, it is incomprehensible to want to go on welfare. This is not a lifestyle to
aspire to! The ethics of personal responsibility, accountability and honesty in me are
very strong, and I thought we had fostered these in our children too. I am not imply-
ing that these values are absent in those who receive welfare support. But the ratio-
nale of my son's application for welfare is an abuse. The system was intended as a
safety net to catch you if you fall, not to encourage a jump.53
Another Globe and Mail article published in October 1994 also pointed to the alleged
abuses the system was fostering.
54
The concerns expressed in the rural media were somewhat different from those of the
Globe and Mail, illustrating the particular worries of rural Ontario residents. For
example, The Sault Star devoted considerable attention to this issue. During the week
of June 13, 1994, The Sault Star published a four-part series on youth and Ontario's
social safety net. Again and again, concerns were raised about the harmful effects of
awarding teenagers assistance, not least of which was the fear that healthy families
would be pulled apart by impetuous teenagers seeking an easy life.55 Teenagers were
portrayed as bragging about their ability to obtain welfare56 and as manipulative in
how they reported their cases to social assistance administrators. 57 Underlying these
concerns was the fear that those who became eligible for assistance were likely to
move to a larger urban centre, often Toronto.
e) 1995 New Democratic Party Reforms
Faced by this chorus of criticism, the NDP government instituted a new set of
regulations that slightly toughened the requirements for youth welfare. As has been
mentioned, the NDP government launched a review of youth welfare in 1994 that was
not accepted, but was replaced by more stringent requirements in early 1995.58 The
"special circumstances" test was kept, but there was an attempt to flesh out its meaning
in the Policy Manual. Four broad categories were enunciated that could form the basis
of a special circumstances claim. The first category was physical, emotional, or sexual
abuse.59 This could include verbal abuse, or exposure to the abuse of another family
member. The onus was placed on the teenager to show this abuse, and the word of the
53. E. Lowe, "Jump Right In: The Safety Net's Great" Globe and Mail (21 July 1994) A24.
54. J. Breckenridge, "Student-Welfare System Seriously Abused, School Board Says" Globe and Mail
(22 October 1994) A7.
55. A. Tomec, "Broken Family, Broken Dreams" The Sault Star (15 June 1994) BI.
56. "Something to Brag About" The Sault Star (14 June 1994) B 1.
57. A. Tomec, "Savvy to the System" The Sault Star (13 June 1994).
58. Supra note 21 at 1.
59. Policy Manual (April 1995) Tab 0304-05 at 7-10.
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youth was not by itself sufficient. For instance, in situations in which physical abuse
was not readily apparent, the youth had to prove his or her claim by obtaining
documentation from a third party such as a guidance counsellor, social worker, teacher,
police officer, clergy member, neighbour, other relative, or even a sibling.60 Secondly,
irreconcilable differences and withdrawal of family support which was clearly dem-
onstrated could substantiate a claim of special circumstances. This did not include
situations of normal sibling rivalry, or circumstances in which parents were applying
reasonable rules, such as cleaning up one's room or attending school.61 Thirdly,
situations that clearly demonstrated the parents' inability to provide adequate care and
support to the youth constituted special circumstances. For instance, if the parent
abused drugs or alcohol, was emotionally unstable or incarcerated, then the parent
would be deemed unable to provide adequate care and support.62 Lastly, special
circumstances could be found if there was no familial home or financial support
available to the youth. This could include scenarios in which the parent had died,
abandoned the youth, or where there was serious overcrowding in the home.
63
As has been pointed out by Ian Morrison, the new guidelines had both positive and
negative characteristics. On the positive side, they stressed that teenagers should be
encouraged to complete high school.64 More negatively, many aspects of the new
guidelines were very subjective, and implied that welfare administrators had more
discretion than the regulations intended. For example, it could be inferred, albeit
erroneously, that administrators could require counselling for youths, even after
special circumstances had been found. 65 Other provisions were also unclear. What,
for instance, constituted "irreconcilable family differences"? Given these amorphous
provisions, teenagers were increasingly refused interim assistance if they appealed to
SARB. 66
Such problems with discretion were indicative of some of the most important limita-
tions placed on youth's eligibility for welfare, which often occur at the lowest levels
of policy implementation. Welfare workers are generally not trained in assessing
family relationships in the same way as children's aid workers. This has increased the
level of subjectivity in the screening of applicants. Justice for Children and Youth
reports that teenagers are often told over the phone that they are ineligible for welfare,
or that they require a third person of responsible character to be involved in their claim.
Or, youths are told that a family assessment is mandatory, which - for teenagers who
60. Ibid. at 8-9.
61. Ibid. at 8-9.
62. Ibid. at 8.
63. Ibid. at 10.
64. Supra note 21 at 3.
65. Ibid. at 8.
66. Supra note 38.
Youth, Welfare and Politics in the 1990s
may already have experienced unpleasant government intervention - may dissuade
them from pursuing their claims further.6
7
f) Constitutional Challenge to "Special Circumstances" at the Social
Assistance Review Board
A constitutional challenge to the special circumstances requirement for youth was
successfully argued in a 1996 SARB appeal known as Pyke68 In this case, two legal
clinics - Justice for Children and Youth, and Hastings and Prince Edward Legal
Services - represented a woman named Pyke who moved out of her mother's home
in 1992 due to the cramped living arrangements, the resulting lack of privacy, as well
as ongoing arguments with her mother. The issues before the review board were
whether the requirement of special circumstances for youth violated section 15 of the
Charter's equality guarantee of the Charter;69 and if so, was this a reasonable and
demonstrably justifiable limit within the meaning of sectionl of the Charter? In a
twenty-seven page decision, the SARB found that there was a violation of s.15. The
government regulation made a distinction based solely on Pyke's age. Although the
Attorney General argued that the distinction was based upon the capacities, needs, and
circumstances of the age group involved and that the distinction was made to accom-
modate these differences, the Review Board rejected this line of argument. Instead,
the Board inquired as to whether the legislative distinction was based on a group
association or on an individual's merits and capacities. It determined that, because
there was no standardized test to determine special circumstances, the distinction was
based on a group association. Thus, the legislation was found to be discriminatory.
The Review Board went on to hold that the special circumstances provision was not
saved by s. 1 of the Charter. The Attorney General claimed the objective of the "special
circumstances" requirement was threefold:
1. In combination with other Ontario legislation, to ensure that the needs of chil-
dren and adolescents are met in a manner which is appropriate to their age and
circumstances, either through an adult who can care for the adolescent in his or
her home or by direct payment to the adolescent where no such adult's home is
available or appropriate.
2. To support the family unit and not interfere with its integrity, where the family
unit is appropriate for the child or adolescent.
67. Supra note 21 at 10. Other authors have commented upon the discretion granted to social assistance
administrators generally. See M. Ginsburg, "Discretionary Powers in the General Welfare Assistance
Act of Ontario" (1987) J.L. & Social Pol'y 1 at 2; and see N. des Rosiers & B. Feldthusen, "Discre-
tion in Social Assistance Legislation" (1992) 8 J.L. & Social Pol'y 204.
68. SARB L-09-21-43B (27 May 1996; Solomon, Fyles, Shilling) [hereinafter Pyke].
69. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to
the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11. The provision could not be challenged under the Human
Rights Code because the Code does not protect those under eighteen years of age from age discrimi-
nation. Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c.H.19, as am.
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3. That the need for assistance should be assessed by considering the family unit
as a whole and the support obligations of others, along with individual require-
ments. 70
Using the Oakes7 l test, the Board rejected these objectives. Instead, SARB pointed
out that "the legislation in question is not Child Welfare legislation, as the objectives
suggest, but rather legislation with a primary purpose to provide for the financial needs
for those persons who fit within the definition of a person in need. The objectives are
thus inappropriate. '72 Therefore, the Review Board found that the regulation failed
on the pressing and substantial objective portion of the Oakes test. The Review Board
continued the section 1 analysis, and also held that it failed at the minimal impairment
stage. Using the Attorney General's stated objectives of the provision, SARB deter-
mined that there were less intrusive methods to protect family structures. In addition,
the Attorney General's claim that the special circumstances test was needed to ensure
that various pieces of legislation all work together was deemed defective because "not
all persons are covered under the proposal.
'73
This decision was viewed as a victory by those hoping to expand youth welfare, but
its importance was undermined by several factors. Most obviously, it was a decision
of a tribunal, rather than a court of law. Although an administrative tribunal, such as
SARB, has jurisdiction to decide Charter issues, it only has the power to grant a
constitutional remedy to the individual appellant before it (namely Pyke). It does not
have the power to strike down the special circumstances test from the Act on the basis
that it is unconstitutional. The Government of Ontario was therefore not required to
amend the legislation or change its official polices. Nonetheless, the Pyke decision
was treated as persuasive by subsequent panels of the Board and the Ministry found
its decisions very difficult to defend when appealed to the Review Board. After Pyke,
youths who appealed their initial assessment, were often awarded interim assistance
by SARB pending disposition of their case, no doubt due to their increased likelihood
of successfully challenging the special circumstances provision. 74 The provincial
government appealed this decision to the Ontario Court (General Division)(Divisional
Court), but it took two years before this next step was reached.
4) THE CONSERVATIVES IN POWER: THE CURRENT STATUS OF YOUTH
WELFARE POLICY
a) New Limitations
The Progressive Conservatives altered the legislation regarding youth welfare in a
number of ways after attaining power in 1995. Two major sets of revisions took place,
70. Supra note 68 at 21.
71. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200, 65 N.R. 87.
72. Supra note 68 at 21.
73. Ibid. at 27.
74. Interview with C. Milne, supra note 38.
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the first in 1996 and the second in 1998. While the special circumstances test was kept,
many other limitations on youth welfare applicants were implemented.
Under the 1996 regulations, school attendance was made mandatory and failure to
attend education or training programs would lead to the youth's ineligibility.75 This
requirement was made explicit:
No person who is eligible...shall continue to be so eligible where he or she has been
absent from his or her education or training program unless the welfare administra-
tor is satisfied that the absence was justified and eligibility shall cease the month
following the month the welfare administrator is advised of the absence. 76
The policy guidelines dictate that "16-17 year olds will no longer have the option of
to either go to school or look for employment. Youth must be either in school or
training or they will be ineligible for assistance. '77 The stated rationale for this policy
was economic: "obtaining a high school education will assist the youth to obtain and
keep employment in the future."'78 This placed a new burden on youth welfare
recipients. Previously, youth had been encouraged to attend school regularly, but there
were no legislative provisions allowing welfare administrators to enforce this require-
ment, although some municipalities had attempted to institute such policies anyway. 79
The only scenarios under the new regulation where a youth could be excluded from
this requirement were if he or she were denied admission to an educational institution
for reasons outside the person's control, or if there was medical evidence of a condition
that prevented attendance.8 0 A more onerous change was the determination that youth
had only one opportunity to gain and keep welfare assistance. Thus, if a youth's
eligibility was revoked, he or she could not re-apply. 81 Clearly, a more interventionist,
instrumentalist policy was enunciated, the effect of which has been to create a form





77. Policy Manual (1 January 1996) Tab 0304-05 at 14.
78. Ibid.
79. For example, in Hastings County students were docked up to. $21 per day for a missing a day of
classes without a proper excuse. B. Hunt, "Cutting Class can be Costly" The Intelligencer (3 March
1995).
80. Supra note 75.
81. Ibid.
82. Learnfare is typically understood as a policy in which value of a family's welfare cheque is tied to
the propensity the family's children have to attend school. Such policies have been brought into
effect in several American jurisdictions, the best known of which in Wisconsin. See M.A. Drumbl,
"Exploring the Constitutional Limits to Workfare and Learnfare" (1994) 10 J.L. & Social Pol'y. 107
at 115. Under this legislation, families lost their "Aid for Families with Dependant Children Grant"
(AFDC) if their children failed to attend school. (1987 Wis. Laws 27; Wis. Admin. Code para [HHS]
201.195(1), 4(a), 4(b), (8) (March 1990)). While these types of measures have not always been
judged successful, they have remained politically popular. For comments on the problems of this
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There were other limitations placed on youth welfare in the 1996 regulations. As a
condition of eligibility a welfare administrator could require that the teenager take part
in family counselling.8 3 Although this term of eligibility was premised on the willing-
ness of the parents to participate, the regulations did not take into consideration
whether the youth was willing to participate in such counselling. This condition
insinuated that the youth was the party behaving irrationally. As a further condition to
ensure the good behaviour of the welfare recipient, the youth might also be required
to maintain contact with a "responsible adult" of at least twenty-one years of age, who
was to ensure that the youth was keeping adequate living arrangements, and was to
notify the welfare administrator if these conditions were no longer being sustained.
84
Justice for Children and Youth has criticized this aspect of the policy for a number of
reasons:
First, the youth may not have a trusting relationship with any such adult and may
turn to strangers. Second, it imposes a tremendous burden on any adult who comes
into contact with the youth and the youth may be treated like a hot potato. Third, it
places the youth and the adult in a position of "subject and snitch" and in the end,
may be counter to the objective that it seeks to foster.85
With the implementation of the Ontario Works Act and its accompanying regulations 86
and policy directives, 87 the limitations placed on teenage social assistance applicants
were made even more stringent. The legislation and regulations added three new
hurdles. First, sixteen and seventeen year olds are required to have an adult act as a
trustee. Social assistance no longer goes directly to the recipient but will be paid to an
adult, who is then to dispense this money to the youth as needed. 88 How these adults
style of learnfare see M.K. Gotlieb, "Pennsylvania's Learnfare Experiment: Real Welfare Reform or
Politics as Usual" (1995) 100 Dickinson L.R. 151; and M.E. Ethridge, and S.L. Percy, "A New Kind
of Public Policy Encounters Disappointing Results: Implementing Leamfare in Wisconsin" (1993)
53 Pub. Admin. Rev. 340.
83. Supra note 80.
84. Ibid.
85. Justice for Children and Youth, General Welfare Assistance Act, (1996) [unpublished, archived at
Justice for Children and Youth] 6.
86. O.Reg. 134/98.
87. Ontario, Ontario Works Policy Directives: Making Welfare Work (1 June 1998), [hereinafter Policy
Directives].
88. Ontario Works Act, supra note 4 at s. 17. This policy was considered as early as June 1997. The Min-
ister of Community and Social Services, Janet Ecker, commented in June 1997 that a teenager leav-
ing his or her family home would be required to "have adult supervision, and if there is indeed
financial support that's required [sic], it will go through a trustee." Ontario, Legislative Assembly,
Debates (18 June 1997) at 10,769 (J. Ecker). This policy is another example of the predominant
ideological position vis-a-vis youth suggesting that increased legalization will solve irresponsible
youth behaviour. Janet Ecker has shown herself to be a strong proponent of this position. Ecker, for
example, co-chaired the 1996 provincial government report that recommended "boot camps." The
report sought to reduce youth's "anti-social behaviour" by creating a highly-supervised, legalized
test program that would encourage offenders to "gain insight into their behaviour and to deal with
the consequences of accepting responsibility for their criminal actions." Ontario, Solicitor General
Youth, Welfare and Politics in the 1990s
will be chosen is as yet undecided. One possibility mentioned in the Policy
Directives is that non-governmental organizations who deal with this age group may
be given the responsibility of administering the funds.8 9 However, given that many
non-governmental organizations (or NGOs) already face heavy workloads, this may
not be plausible. A second new barrier is the stipulation that youth may only apply
once for welfare assistance. 90 Thus, if a youth applicant is turned down just after
turning sixteen years of age, he or she will not be permitted to reapply in the two-year
period between their sixteenth and eighteenth birthdays. Finally, sixteen and seventeen
year old couples and single-parent mothers are now treated identically as others in
their age group, and are thus officially required to meet the special circumstances
standard.9l
b) Constitutional Challenge to "Special Circumstances" at Ontario Court
(General Division) (Divisional Court)
In addition to these changes, the Ontario government also assaulted youth welfare
applicants by appealing SARB's Pyke decision in which the special circumstances test
was held to be unconstitutional on the grounds of age discrimination. 92 The appeal
was heard by the Divisional Court on May 26, 1998 before Justices Farley, Chapnik,
and Karam. The case is significant not only because it determined the welfare rights
of Ontario's sixteen and seventeen year olds, but because of the dearth of section 15
jurisprudence across Canada in respect of youth. It is therefore one of the major
decisions on the equality rights of young people in Canada. While the Supreme Court
has given considerable attention to equality issues relating to old age,93 there have
been no Supreme Court or Court of Appeal decisions on youth discrimination, let alone
determinations regarding youth age discrimination relating to social assistance. Dean
Peter Hogg of Osgoode Hall Law School has ruminated on the issue of youth age
discrimination. He reasons that youth age distinctions are discriminatory, but he also
concludes that they are necessary for administrative efficiency, and should thus be saved
under section 1 of the Charter.94 The limited number of relevant lower court decisions,
and the Minister of Correctional Services, Recommendations from the Task Force on Strict Discipl-
ine for Young Offenders to the Ontario (Toronto, Queen's Printer, August 1996) at 5.
89. The Policy Directives state that municipalities may "contract with an agency to act as a trustee for an
applicant aged 16 or 17 years. The delivery agent [the municipality] must ensure the responsibilities
and available compensation are agreed to by the agency (Supra note 87 at 19.0-6)."
90. Ibid. at 19.0-15 to 19.0-16.
91. Ibid at 19.0-6 & 19.0-10.
92. Despite the 1996 SARB decision regarding the constitutionality of special circumstances, the test
was incorporated into the subsequent Ontario Works Regulations and Policy Directives. See supra
note 86 and supra note 87 at 19.0-7 to 19.0-10.
93. See McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, 76 D.L.R. (4th) 545, 118 N.R.; Harri-
son v. University of British Columbia, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 451, 77 D.L.R.(4th) 55, 120 N.R.; Stoffinan v.
Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 483, 76 D.L.R. (4th) 700, 118 N.R. 241; and Douglas!
Kwantlen Faculty Association v. Douglas College, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570, 77 D.L.R. (4th) 94, 118
N.R. 340.
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meanwhile, have been split in their findings. In Mohamed v. Metropolitan Toronto,
the Ontario Divisional Court held that the legislation preventing youth under age
sixteen from applying for welfare was a breach of s. 15, but was saved by s. 1.95 Even
more on point was Clemons v. City of Winnipeg,96 a 1994 decision of the Manitoba
Court of Queen's Bench that was reversed on other grounds by the Manitoba Court of
Appeal. 97 In Clemons the complainant argued that the municipal restrictions on
welfare applicants under eighteen years of age were discriminatory. The Court of
Queen's Bench agreed, holding that it:
... Is only where the person seeking relief is under 18 years of age that the city pur-
ports to inquire into and set itself up as the adjudicator of the ins and outs of the par-
ent/child relationship and of the reasonableness of terms which the parent purports
to impose on the child as a condition of the city's granting social assistance.
The city advances no evidence under s.1 of the Charter which might justify this
clearly discriminatory treatment.98
However, as mentioned, the Manitoba Court of Appeal reversed this decision on the
basis that the complainant in Clemons failed to exhaust the available administrative
appeal process, prior to applying to the Court.
Returning to the Divisional Court decision in Pyke, the court unanimously reasoned
that there was no violation of section 15, and that, even if there was, it was saved by
section 1 of the Charter. The Court concluded that the special circumstances test did
not place a burden on this age group, and that the distinction was not based on a group
stereotype. It reasoned that various pieces of government legislation, such as the
Divorce Act99 and the Child and Family Services Act, 100 should be considered together
in analysing the constitutionality of special circumstances. "It may be observed," the
court stated, "that the legislation in this area is a patchwork of provisions in different
statutes; however it appears that they have been joined together to form a serviceable
quilt."'' Thus, the special circumstances test "is not an onerous requirement; rather
it would merely be a matter of showing that the legal and practical financial need is
truly present."' 102 The court also refused to acknowledge that legislative decisions as
94. P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) at 943.
95. Mohamed v. Toronto (Municipality of Metropolitan) (1996), 133 D.L.R. (4th) 108, 89 O.A.C.-339
(Div. Ct.).
96. Clemons v.Winnipeg (City of) (1994), 22 C.R.R. (2d) 160, 93 Man. R. (2d) 281, 114 D.L.R. (4th)
702 (Q.B.).
97. Clemons v. Winnipeg (City of) (1995), 27 C.R.R. (2d) 353, 100 Man. R. (2d) 64, 122 D.L.R. (4th)
676 (C.A.).
98. Supra note 96 at 164-165.
99. R.S.C. 1985 (2d Supp.), c.3, as am.
100. R.S.O. 1990, c.C.1l,asam.
101. Ontario (Attorney General) v. Pyke, (15 Octoberl998), Doc. 364/97 (Ont. Div Ct.) [[1998] O.J. No.
4125, online: QL (OJ)].
102. Ibid.
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to age divisions, including the special circumstances test, are based on stereotypes:
"If viewed from one perspective, this may be characterized as stereotyping; if looked
at from another, it may be viewed as the evolutionary distillation of human experi-
.ence."103 This view was strengthened, in the Court's opinion, by the fact that welfare
administrators are required to make individual assessments of applicants' eligibility,
and the Court concluded that this demonstrates that the special circumstances provi-
sion "does not rely on stereotypes or presumed characteristics."' 104 Given that the
Court could find no onerous requirement to the special circumstances test, nor a
stereotypical application of a presumed group or personal stereotype, it was held that
there is no violation of s.15.
The Court continued the Charter analysis and suggested that even if there was an
infringement of section 15, that violation would be saved by section 1. It is under the
auspices of section 1 that Hogg believes that legislation precluding youth from certain
benefits should be saved,105 and the Court accepted the Attorney General's section 1
submissions. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in McKinney, the Court found
that the government should face a less stringent burden in terms of justifying the
limitation of the equality right in the context of age discrimination. 10 6 The Court
accepted the three objectives of the "special circumstances" test put forward by the
Attorney General at the SARB hearing. 107 This finding did not acknowledge that the
definition of the government's objectives was a contentious issue. The Attorney
General lacked research demonstrating the validity of these objectives, relying instead
solely on the acceptance of these objectives by the Divisional Court in Mohamed.
Counsel for Pyke, however, stressed that the Attorney General could not prove the
objectives were accurate and argued that the Divisional Court in Mohamed had
mistakenly accepted them without the tendering of any proof whatsoever of their
validity.108 Instead, counsel for Pyke submitted that the purpose of the provision was
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid. This assessment, the court believed, distinguished this case from Mohamed. In Mohamed, it
was held that the prohibition against those under age sixteen from receiving welfare was a violation
of s.15.
105. Supra note 94 at 943.
106. Supra note 101. McKinney, supra note 93.
107. The objectives stated by the AG were nearly identical at the SARB and Divisional Court hearings. At
the Divisional Court the accepted objectives were:
A) in combination with other legislation, to ensure that the needs of children are met in a manner
which is appropriate to their age and circumstances, either through an adult who can care for an
under 18 year old in that person's home or through direct payment to the 16-17 year old where no
such home is available;
B) to support the family unit and not to interfere with its integrity where the family unit is appropri-
ate for an under 18 year old.
C) to assess the need for assistance appropriately by considering the family unit as a whole and the
support obligations of others, along with individual requirements.
108. To support their contention that the government must demonstrate that their stated objectives are in
fact the objectives of the legislation, counsel for Pyke relied on the Ontario Court of Appeal's deci-
sion in R. v. M.(C.), in which it was held that it "...Is not enough for the government to assert an
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to ensure that those in need received financial assistance, which was the conclusion
drawn by SARB in the decision under appeal. The Court, however, was content to cite
Mohamed as proof that these were the objectives of the regulation.
The court found that there is a rational connection between these objectives and the
special circumstances test. In doing so, the Court impliedly rejected the submission
of counsel for Pyke that the government had failed to demonstrate that granting welfare
to teenagers would lead to family breakdown.1 09 Counsel also challenged the tradi-
tional societal view of how family units should be kept together. Why is it, it was
queried, that the family structure is encouraged to remain intact in the context of
abusive parents but not in instances of divorce where one spouse is abused? These
issues did not trouble the Divisional Court, which failed to address these arguments
in finding a rationale connection. The Court also found that the government minimally
impaired the section 15 rights of youth. In so holding, the Court drew upon Supreme
Court jurisprudence that suggested that Courts should not second guess legislative
line-drawing. Moreover, the Court rejected Pyke's assertion that some teenagers might
be left with no financial resources, stating that "there are no legal gaps as to the ability
of that age group to receive financial support." 0
The Divisional Court's decision in Pyke is not being appealed. The limited financial
and personnel resources of the organizations that typically launch challenges to this
type of government legislation dictate that battles must be carefully chosen, and the
Ontario Works Act has several onerous provisions regarding youth that could be
constitutionally challenged instead. For example, the previously mentioned provision
that prevents youth from applying for welfare more than once could be challenged
under the auspices of sections 7 and 15 of the Charter. Nevertheless, considering the
lack of appellate level equality jurisprudence dealing with youth, a successful appeal
of Pyke would have been helpful in establishing a precedent that would be adopted in
Ontario and strongly considered by other Canadian jurisdictions.
5) FACTORS HINDERING CONTINUED OPPOSITION TO YOUTH
WELFARE POLICIES
In addition to the limited resources of those seeking to challenge youth welfare
legislation, there are at least three practical difficulties in beginning a challenge to
legislation that limits the rights of youth to social assistance. The first can be discerned
from the written reasons as well as the nature of the questions posed by the panel of
objective for limiting guaranteed rights under s. 1; there must, in my view, also be an underlying evi-
dentiary basis to support the assertion." R. v. M.(C.) (1995) 23 O.R.(3d) 629 at 639, 98 C.C.C. (3d)
481, 82 O.A.C. 68 (C.A.).
109. Counsel for Pyke relied on the 1988 provincial government's own Transitions report, in which the
Social Assistance Review Committee, in which the committee reported that the prospects of family
reconciliation would be greater if social assistance was granted to this age group, subject to condi-
tions for the ongoing receipt of the assistance: Supra note 15 at 235.
110. Supra note 101.
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the Divisional Court during the oral argument of the Pyke case. It is this author's
opinion that the questions posed by the panel in particular demonstrate that the
judiciary sometimes share the preconceptions of the general public when it comes to
the issue of youth receiving social assistance. 111 As well, the written reasons evince
the judiciary's traditional wariness of extending economic benefits beyond the levels
stipulated by the legislatures.
A second practical limitation is that an attack on government regulations requires an
appeal launched by a youth. However, the age of the clients poses a difficulty. A
seventeen year old who is informed that he or she is ineligible for welfare support is
unlikely to challenge a government official or seek the advice of a legal clinic. A
teenager will be discouraged from challenging a law if told that court proceedings will
last a year or more. Unless the applicant is aware of interim assistance, the apparent
benefits to the youth are certainly less than clear. For youths concerned with sustaining
themselves, legal proceedings would appear to be an inadequate solution, and many
teens referred to clinics in order to appeal their assessment never actually contact those
clinics. 1
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Third, youth, especially this segment of youth, have weak political voices. Lacking
the franchise, and most often with no formal political affiliation, youth welfare
applicants have little ammunition with which to fight their battles on a larger scale. If
teachers, public servants, and health care professionals had difficulty making an
impact on Ontario government policy, then convincing a few thousand youth that they
would be successful is an impossible task. Moreover, public opinion is not supportive
of youth concerns and can not be counted upon for assistance.
The Ontario Works Act renamed SARB the Social Benefits Tribunal. 113 More funda-
mental changes to this tribunal, however, constitute the fourth practical limitation on
youth welfare challenges. The Social Benefits Tribunal's membership, like SARB's
before it, is appointed by order of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, 114 and since
the Harris government has gained power, the Tribunal's composition and authority
have altered. There has been a rapid turnover in membership since 1995, and the new
members have generally held more conservative social agendas. 1 5 Because of this,
the likelihood that the Social Benefits Tribunal would come to a decision like Pyke
has decreased. As well, the provincial government has placed a privative clause on the
decisions of the Social Benefits Tribunal to discourage judicial review. Lastly and
111. Notes of the author from Divisional Court hearing in Pyke (May 26, 1998).
112. Supra note 38.
113. Supra note 4, s.60.
114. Ibid., s.61(I).
115. See supra note 25 at 191-192. While there has been little mention of this in the popular press, the
changing make-up of SARB has been brought up several times in the Legislative Assembly. For
debates on the topic see Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates (11 October 1995) at 215-217; (16
October 1995) at 257-258. For a rare comment in the popular press, see B Livesey, 'Trial and Ter-
ror" Eye [of Toronto] [11 February 1999] 11.
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most importantly, the Ontario Works Act has removed the appeal tribunal's ability to
decide constitutional issues.
The popular press has generally failed to cover youth welfare since 1995. The last
Globe and Mail article on this topic, for example, was published in July 1995. In a
piece entitled "Teenagers a Prime Target for Harris Cuts," Margaret Philp expressed
some concern over the wisdom of more stringent requirements for teenage welfare.
The article pointed out that the number of youth on welfare had been shrinking both
in real terms (from 7316 in 1990 to 6492 in March 1995), and in their percentage of
the total welfare recipients (from 5.2 per cent in 1990, to 1.9 per cent in March
1995).116 The author coldly recounted the Conservatives' strategy in regards to this
issue: "The Tories took advantage of the public's instinctive distrust of teenagers and
the widespread perception that 16- and 17-year-olds in Ontario have become increas-
ingly dependent on welfare.""17 The danger of decreasing welfare for youths was also
discussed:
Professionals who work with street youth warn that disqualifying 16- and 17-year-
olds from welfare benefits will force many to live on the street. They fear that
because teenagers this age are simply too old and often too hardened to live as
ward's of children's aid societies, it makes no sense to regard them as too young to
qualify for welfare.118
However, such views have been voiced faintly since 1995. What affect the changes in
youth welfare policy have had are difficult to quantitatively analyse, but the growing
numbers of "squeegee kids" on the corners of Toronto's major intersections is a sign
that the changes may have had some negative consequences. 1 19
6) CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The present regulations and policies result in a discriminatory approach to sixteen-to-
eighteen year olds who find themselves in need. The legislation fails to address the
very artificial nature of distinctions based upon age, especially in regards to youth.
One sixteen year old might be mature enough to live independently while another may
not yet be capable of making informed choices. Imposing an even more stringent
"special circumstances" test, as the current legislation does, fails to address the very
special needs of this age group.




119. These youth are often derided in the press though the reasons they are forced into this work is rarely
discussed. For example, see "Squeegee Kids Popping up all Over: Police are Cracking Down on the
Wiper Brigades But Few Teens Fear the Fines," Globe and Mail (11 June 1997) Al; "Squeegee Kids
Clean Up," Globe and Mail (12 June 1997); H. Stancu, "MPP vows to wipe out army of squeegee
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The story of youth welfare policy in Ontario has been tied closely to political events.
The result has been a polarized, politicized debate, in which the issue of youth welfare
has been used to score political points. The Conservatives have decried welfare fraud
by teenagers, while connecting youth with family breakdown and crime. This is a
popular position, and the fact that just a few thousand teenagers received welfare is
rarely mentioned. Policy-makers have not only been forced to find solutions in the
context of this political debate, but have had to deal with the inherent difficulties of
determining an effective youth welfare policy. The needs of disadvantaged teenagers
must be fulfilled, but at the same time youth must not be encouraged to leave family
homes that are simply experiencing the normal turmoil of the teenage years. This is a
simple-sounding goal, but it has, obviously, been very difficult to implement.
What, then, is the optimal solution to the dilemma of youth welfare? The use of special
provisions for granting welfare to this group in most Canadian and many international
jurisdictions indicates that limitations are to a certain extent desirable. The real
question, therefore, is not whether limitations should be imposed, but what form those
provisions should take and how they should be implemented. I will conclude this paper
by offering two recommendations that could greatly assist in providing a counter-
weight to the politically-driven policies of the past five years. First, the burden of
producing evidence of special circumstances should be lessened in some situations,
particularly when teens will have difficulty meeting the evidentiary burden for
demonstrating special circumstances. Government regulations should therefore rec-
ognize instances, for example, in which verbally abused youths have difficulty
obtaining documentation of their parents' conduct. Secondly, there is a need to
re-target counselling efforts away from repairing family integrity and towards helping
youth. A child-centred approach is needed. Re-integrating teens as healthy members
of society - not just into their familial relationships - requires this. Thus, counsel-
ling should be provided to youths, and they should be assisted in the continuation of
their education.
The value of these suggestions is apparent to those who have contemplated this issue
at length. How could such changes in policy be enacted in the current political and
social environment? First, of course, it would require a governing political party which
holds less radically conservative views on the role of the state in society. More
importantly, it would require that a pool of public opinion be tapped that has thus far
been unused in this debate. Polls consistently demonstrate that many Canadians
profess a concern about child poverty and youth unemployment. It will take a brave
government to challenge the prevailing views of youth delinquency and criminality,
and to appeal instead to public sentiment by highlighting the struggle of some teens
to obtain basic needs. The government must address the fact that these basic needs
would be much more accessible were these individuals aged fifteen years or younger,
or else over the age of seventeen years.

